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Rosemary J. Coombe*
Intellectual property law has at long last become a field of engaged
interdisciplinary inquiry. For years taught primarily by practicing lawyers
and theorized only by liberal philosophers or scholars of law and
economics-and thereby rendered a field of forms and abstractions-the
laws of intellectual property have recently attracted scholars concerned with
* The author would like to thank Peter Jaszi for helpful discussions and his ongoing support and
enthusiasm in the endeavor to expand the fields in which we consider regimes of intellectual property.
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the social contexts of their emergence and the contemporary fields in which
they function.' The majority of these studies have been historical in
emphasis.
What unites the resurgence of historical interest in intellectual property
law is the recognition that concepts such as the "author," the "work," the
"invention," the "original," the "imitation," and the "copy," do not have
self-evident referents. Instead, recent scholarship indicates just how
culturally specific and historically contingent such seemingly transparent
terms actually are, and how complex the contexts in which they emerged,
were contested, and gained legitimacy. For scholars of intellectual
property, the greatest challenge of the last five years has been one of
contextualization-situating the central terms of intellectual property laws
within the worlds of significance in which they attained meaning and the
relations of power in which they legitimated forms of authority. This
review will consider three recent volumes: the first two engage the complex
cultural contexts of copyright law's historical emergence, while the third is
1. In addition to the works reviewed here, see Jane Gaines, Contested Culture: The Image, the
Voice, and the Law (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Carla Hesse, Publishing
and Cultural Politics in Revolutionary Paris 1789-1810 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1991); Peter Jaszi, "Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of
'Authorship,"' Duke Law Journal (1991): 455-502; Peggy Kamuf, Signature Pieces: On the Institution
of Authorship (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); David Lange, "At Play in the Fields of the
Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium," Law and
Contemporary Problems 55 (1992): 139-51; Jessica Litman, 'The Public Domain," Emory Law Journal
39 (1990): 965-1023; Litman, "Copyright as Myth," University of Pittsburgh Law Review 53 (1991):
235-49; Celia Lurie, Cultural Rights: Technology, Legality and Personality (New York: Routledge,
1993); L. Ray Patterson, "Understanding Fair Use," Law & Contemporary Problems 55 (1992): 249-66;
L. Ray Patterson and Stanley W. Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A Law of User's Rights (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1991); Mark Rose, 'The Author in Court: Pope v. Curll (1741)," Cultural
Critique 21 (1992): 197-217; Trevor Ross, "Copyright and the Invention of Tradition," Eighteenth-
Century Studies 26 (1992): 1-27; Susan Stewart, Crimes of Writing: Problems in the Containment of
Representation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Martha Woodmansee, "The Interests of
Disinterestedness," Modern Language Quarterly 45 (1984): 22-47; Woodmansee, "The Genius and the
Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the 'Author,"' Eighteenth-Century
Studies 17 (1984): 425-28: Woodmansee, "The Uses of Kant in England," in Wolfgang Wittkoski, ed.,
Verlorene Klassik? Ein Symposium (TOebingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1986): 237-54; "Aesthetics and
the Policing of Reading," Cultural Critique 11 (1988): 203-21. Perhaps the most important collection
is Martha Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi, eds., The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation
in Law and Literature (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994). This volume is a reprinting of twenty-
two essays that first appeared as a special issue of the Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal
10 (1992): 277-720.
I have attempted to bring anthropological, political, and feminist insights to bear upon issues in
intellectual property in Rosemary J. Coombe, "The Cultural Life of Things: Globalization and
Anthropological Approaches to Commodification," American Journal of International Law and Politics
10 (1) (forthcoming 1994); 'The Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing Identity: Native
Claims in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy," Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 6
(1993): 249-85; "Tactics of Appropriation and the Politics of Recognition in Late Modern Democra-
cies," Political Theory 21 (1993): 411-33; "Publicity Rights and Political Aspiration: Mass Culture,
Gender Identity, and Democracy," New England Law Review 26 (1992): 1221-80; and "Objects of
Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue," Texas Law
Review 69 (1991): 1853-80.
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a less nuanced survey of the history of copyright and author's rights in five
jurisdictions.
Mark Rose's Authors and Owners is an elegantly written and carefully
researched interpretive account of the emergence and development of
British copyright laws in the eighteenth century. An expansion and
extension of Rose's path-breaking article, "The Author as Proprietor:
Donaldson v. Beckett and the Genealogy of Modem Authorship,
' 2
originally published in 1988, this book provides the first comprehensive
overview of the lengthy struggles which attended the transition from a
regime of regulatory patronage and royal prerogative to the modem system
of proprietary control over works of authorship. Examining the sixteenth
through the late eighteenth century, Rose considers the full range of
primary and secondary sources--original manuscripts of bills of Parliament,
the numerous petitions and publications that delineate the contours of the
eighteenth-century "literary property debate," the common law cases and
Chancery injunctions, parliamentary debates and personal correspon-
dence-in a subtle and nuanced reading of the historical record. In so
doing, he weaves a fascinating narrative of the development of the modem
idea of authorship and its relation to the idea of the literary work. These
are the central terms of copyright law, which is perhaps the most
fundamental institutional embodiment of the author-work relation.
Like most fine interdisciplinary interpretive studies, this book shows both
a scrupulous attention to detail and an awareness of larger structural forces.
Rose is attuned to the subtleties of language use in eighteenth-century legal
and philosophical discourse, but resists any recourse to formalist analysis.
He situates his interpretation of the literary property debate within a
historical context shaped by the impact of print technology, the growth of
print literacy and reading publics, responses to market relations, and the
formulation of new aesthetic models of reading and writing. Rose's
approach suggests that copyright law emerged from a historically specific
context in struggles between interested parties who engaged emergent and
already authoritative discourses to make their claims. The authority of the
legal definitions and resolutions of those claims then provided legitimating
cultural resources which produced and affirmed new identities and interests
in the social arena. In this sense, Rose's work shares the perspectives of
many scholars in critical legal studies, feminist legal studies, and the law
2. Representations 23 (1988): 51-85.
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and society tradition; 3 he explores the ways in which law is both culturally
constituted and culturally constitutive.
As Rose acknowledges, it is a peculiarly modem conceit to understand
the relation between the author and the work as a relation between a
proprietor, conceived of as an originator, and a special kind of discrete
commodity, a distinctive "work," conceived of as his "own." Rose shows
how this relationship developed conceptually over an extended period of
time, flowering most fully in the aesthetic theories of Romanticism. Until
recently, liberal theories of possessive individualism and Romantic theories
of authorship dominated both literary theory and the law. With the
emergence of structuralist, poststructuralist, and postmodernist currents of
thought, however, scholars have questioned the primacy and integrity of the
author-work relation, opening the legal foundations of copyright law and
its history to new forms of inquiry. Scholars neither well-versed nor
particularly interested in such areas of literary theory will, however, find
Rose's book both eminently readable and genuinely engaging. By
developing his narrative analysis through examination of concrete cases and
controversies, Rose illuminates wider fields of conceptual debate without
resorting to the jargon that has alienated many readers from developments
in literary theory.
Beginning with a comprehensive survey of the institutions and practices
of printing and publishing in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English
context, Rose commences his account of the literary property debates with
the struggles that led to the passage of the Statute of Anne. Although
recognized as providing the first set of authorial rights in literary works, the
Statute was passed at the behest of booksellers attempting to end the
Stationer's Company monopoly over the printing of books. It was more
than a century after the Act's passage before the nature of the author's right
and the nature of the property to which that right extended were given their
modem form. These developments took shape in an extensive and
contentious discourse manifested in a series of publicly circulated petitions,
3. See Rosemary J. Coombe, "Room for Manoeuver: Toward a Theory of Practice in Critical Legal
Studies," Law and Social Inquiry 14 (1989): 69-121; Coombe, "Contesting the Self: Negotiating
Subjectivities in Nineteenth-Century Ontario Defamation Trials," Studies in Law and Politics 11 (1991):
3-40; Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit (New York: Routledge, 1992); Cornell, Beyond
Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction and the Law (New York: Routledge, 1991); Mary
Joe Frug, Postmodern Legal Feminism (New York: Routledge, 1992); Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge
(New York: Basic Books, 1983); Robert Gordon, "Critical Legal Histories," Stanford Law Review 36
(1984): 57-125; Christine Harrington and Sally Merry, "Ideological Production: The Making of
Community Mediation," Law and Society Review 22 (1988): 709-36; Christine Harrington and Barbara
Yngvesson, "Interpretive Social Research," Law & Social Inquiry 15 (1990): 135-48; Gary Peller, "The
Metaphysics of American Law," California Law Review 73 (1985): 1151-290; Austin Sarat and Thomas
Kearns, eds., Law in Everyday Life (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993); Kim Scheppele,
Legal Secrets: Equality and Efficiency in the Common Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1988); Barbara Yngvesson, Virtuous Citizens, Disruptive Subjects: Order and Complaint in a New
England Court (New York: Routledge, 1993).
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parliamentary and press debates, injunctions, and infamous disputes that
extended well into the nineteenth century. The central concerns of this
discourse included the rights which an author could claim, their origins in
statute or common law, their duration, and the nature of the property to
which they attached.
Proponents of authors' perpetual rights to their literary works (largely the
booksellers, to whom authors assigned these rights in gross) ultimately lost
their case in the 1774 House of Lords decision in Donaldson v. Beckett.
4
During their struggles, however, author's rights advocates, drawing from
philosophical discourses of possessive individualism and aesthetic
discourses of genius and originality, defined the rhetorical means by which
the statutory term of copyright would be successfully challenged. Using
these discursive resources, the debate was continually extended into the
next century. In denying an author's perpetual rights, opponents (often
provincial booksellers, who were denied the London Stationer's Company's
historical privileges) challenged the legitimacy of the property to which the
claim was made. In so doing, they forced their opponents to delineate a
conception of the literary "work" and foreshadowed the dimensions of the
public interest in limiting copyright protection:
Thus the representation of the author as a creator who is entitled to
profit from his intellectual labor came into being through a blending
of literary and legal discourses in the context of struggles over
perpetual copyright. The literary-property struggle generated a body
of texts ... in which aesthetic and legal questions are often indistin-
guishable. What constitutes a literary work? How is a literary
composition different from any other form of invention such as a
clock or an orrery? What is the relationship between literature and
[the] ideas [it expresses]?...
[T]he focus of my discussion is not on subjectivity but on discourse.
I am not concerned with the production of the author as a conscious-
ness so much as with a representation of authorship based on notions
of property, originality, and personality. The production of this
representation involved, among other things, the abstraction of the
concept of literary property from the physical book and then the
presentation of this new, immaterial property as no less fixed and
certain than any other kind of property .... (Rose, 6-7)
5
Rose remarks upon the rhetorical attempts to build a concept of literary
property upon the model of the landed estate, and the complex metaphori-
cal work that was necessary to "establish copyright as an absolute right of
4. Donaldson v. Beckett, 4 Burr 2408, 98 ER 257 (1774).
5. All textual page notations for Rose's work refer to Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The
Invention of Copyright (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
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property, a freehold 'grounded on labour and invention."' (Rose, 8).6
Ultimately, Rose argues, these attempts were unsuccessful because real
property is no more real, fixed, or certain than other forms of property, but
socially created in a nexus of human relationship: "All forms of property
are socially constructed and, like copyright, bear in their lineaments the
traces of the struggles in which they were fabricated"(Rose, 8).
A number of such struggles are addressed, commencing with the
seventeenth-century cases involving the Stationer's Company, and the first
assertions of author's rights. Rose demonstrates the extent to which the
state conditioned its recognition of authors with a system of press
regulation intended to hold authors and printers accountable for publications
deemed libelous, seditious, or blasphemous. Only the Stationer's Company
could publish works and control the production of copies. Although an
author might be paid a fee for the manuscript, the author's proprietary
rights, as rights to commodities with an exchange value, were unacknowl-
edged. As a matter of propriety, the Stationer's Company had developed
a practice of not publishing books without the consent of the writer and of
identifying the author on the title page (a custom affirmed by a Parliamen-
tary edict of 1642). The Stationer's Company nonetheless regarded books
as their own works and properties-devolving from the work of publishing
itself. Rose finds scant evidence of the assertion of an author's property
rights, but in Milton's works, he sees the germination of ideas of authorship
that Locke would further develop. Such nascent notions of property still,
however, seemed very much embedded within convictions of propriety to
which they were to remain bound until well into the eighteenth century
(Rose, 27-30).
The struggle over defining the bookseller's rights continued in the 1690s
as the Stationer's Company battled to renew the Licensing Act and preserve
its monopoly over printing. Those arguing against further state controls
reflected an increasing opposition to monopolies of any kind. Locke was
the first to recommend that the bookseller's property be limited, either to
a fixed term defined from the date of printing, or to a certain number of
years after the death of the author. There is, however, little evidence that
he considered this an author's right; the author here, as for many years
thereafter, was a means to limit the bookseller's rights.
Daniel Defoe and Joseph Addison made stronger claims for authors,
stressing the complementarity of punishment and reward. If the state held
an author responsible for his writings, the state should also reward him for
his noble labors. Ironically, these arguments became the means by which
the booksellers were at once deprived of the perpetual rights to copy books,
6. Quoting William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-69; reprint, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1979), 2:405.
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and granted further extensions of their traditional privileges. Examining the
original manuscript bills and the processes of amendment, Rose shows how
a limited term of copyright (fourteen years with the possibility of a
fourteen-year renewal) was for the first time introduced as a means of
ending a traditional monopoly. The figure of the author as the person in
whom rights were being "vested" or "secured" (an ambiguity that was later
to prove contentious) also served to provide the booksellers with a potent
means of continuing to press their own claims. Contemporary practice
ensured that authors transferred all rights to copy with the physical
manuscript; any right recognized in an author, therefore, would accrue to
the benefit of the booksellers. Although the legislators drew back from
asserting that the author had an "undoubted property" in his writings (Rose,
48), the ground had been laid for this argument to become persuasive. The
Statute of Anne "constituted the author as well as the bookseller as a
person with legal standing" (Rose, 50), even though existing trade practices
and market relations limited the author's bargaining power.
Indeed, in Chapter Four, Rose shows how even in cases that did involve
authors, such as Burnet v. Chetwood,7 issues of propriety were at least as
significant as issues of property. The nature of the author's right remained
amorphous. Burnet had written a book in Latin, discussing the story of
Genesis, containing a facetious conversation between Eve and the serpent
which became quite celebrated. When parts of it were published in English
without his consent, this segment of his work caused Burnet no little
embarrassment. Taking measures to prevent future reprintings, Burnet
succeeded in suppressing the story until a group of booksellers decided to
make the notorious book available in English after his death. His executor
sought an injunction in Chancery.
Rather than address the questions of whether the author's property
extended to translations or whether these were to be considered new works,
Lord Chancellor Macclesfield based his decision on the Court of
Chancery's superintendence over all books, and the inappropriateness of
such a work getting into those "vulgar" hands from which the author had
attempted to conceal it by writing in Latin (Rose, 50). The concern with
regulating the press combines here with a sensitivity to an author's sense
of propriety, precluding any recourse to economic questions or even to
considerations of whether a translation was a new work or the work of the
original author. No insight was afforded into the boundaries of the "work"
and thus into the nature of the property that copyright protected.
When specifically asked to address questions about the property rights
bestowed by the Statute of Anne, the Court of Chancery evaded them.
Former members of the Stationer's Company, however, were usually
7. Burner v. Chetwood, 2 Mer 441, 35 ER 1008 (1720).
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successful when they attempted to secure injunctions against reprinters of
books to which the members had long assumed they held exclusive rights.
Even though the statutory term of copyright had long since expired, the
Court of Chancery was apt to grant such injunctions on the basis of the
original transfer of title from the author (Rose, 51-52). In other words,
literary property was treated like other forms of property, and the limitation
term in the Statute was simply ignored. Such Chancery injunctions
provided further ammunition for the booksellers to argue later in the
century that the author had a perpetual common law right recognized in
equity if not in courts of law. The Statute, they asserted, simply provided
a new field of remedies for a right that preexisted its passage.
The 1730s saw renewed agitation for an extended term of copyright,
which the House of Lords was in no way inclined to grant. The arguments
made by booksellers on behalf of an extended copyright term for authors
illustrate the developing idea of the author's connection to his work. In the
1735 Letter from an Author to a Member of Parliament, a common law
author's right was asserted in these terms:
For if there be such a Thing as Property upon Earth, an Author has it
in his Work. A Father cannot more justly call his Child, than an
Author can his Work, his own. Every Reason, for which Property was
at first introduced, and has since been maintained in other Cases, holds
equally in this (Rose, 55).
Rose takes metaphor seriously as the means by which cultural significance
is conveyed and he capably explores the tropes of paternity, theology,
horticulture, and real estate that pervaded the arguments on behalf of
literary property in the eighteenth century. The patriarchal notion of a
father begetting his book and the book as his child is significant here, for
it suggests a notion of creation and paternity that goes far beyond a simple
notion of property as possession or commodity. A father's child is his
own, not because he owns it or has invested in it, but because this child
will carry the father's name and likeness. The child is the means by which
the father's immortality is to be realized. The literary work is a very
specific and peculiar form of property. The mixed metaphors used to
justify it suggest that issues of the author's persona and reputation, his fame
(or infamy), in addition to his fortune, were understood to be fundamentally
at stake.
Alexander Pope, who recognized this, forced the courts to enforce the
Statute (Rose, 59) and attend more seriously to the nature of the property
in which an author could claim a right. The emphasis of the debate shifted
from the bookseller's pecuniary rights to what we might today deem the
author's rights of publicity. His 1741 suit against Edmund Curll is
[Vol. 6: 397
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illustrative.' Pope had tricked Curll into publishing a volume of his
personal correspondence in an era when to publish one's own letters was
considered excessively vain. Once an "unauthorized" version was
circulating, however, a gentleman would be excused for wanting to ensure
that he was fairly represented. This ruse enabled Pope both to publish an
"authorized" version of his letters and to use Curll as an example of an
irresponsible bookseller. The tactic dramatized the limitations of the bill,
concurrently pending in the House of Lords, to extend the bookseller's term
of rights. The eventual lawsuit against Curll also clarified an author's
rights in his writings and extended the scope of literary property. Again,
Pope's use of the statute indicates how a commercial regulatory statute was
deployed to pursue matters having as much to do with propriety as with
commerce:
Pope's preface to the 1737 edition of his letters is dominated by the
genteel discourse in which he displays his indignation as a man of
honor against booksellers' violation of his privacy. But what we can
call the "discourse of property" makes itself felt as well in the preface,
as when Pope complains that the booksellers' practice of soliciting
copies of authors' letters leads to petty thievery.... Moreover, if the
quantity of material procured falls short, the bookseller will fill out the
volume with anything he pleases, so that the poor author has "not only
Theft to fear, but Forgery." And the greater the writer's reputation,
the greater will be the demand for the books and so the greater the
injury to the author: "[YIour Fame and your Property suffer alike; you
are at once expos'd and plunder'd" (Rose, 62).
This complex discourse of property and propriety underscores the
mercurial instabilities of literary property in an era marked by the shift in
the author's role as gentleman and scholar to that of a professional trading
in a new form of commodity. Moreover, the question of whether an
individual's personal and private correspondence should be protected under
a statute "for encouraging learning" and "for the Encouragement of Learned
Men to Compose and Write useful Books" compelled the court to consider
the scope of literary property as distinguished from the physical property
in which it was fixed. Rose includes Pope's Bill of Complaint (drafted by
William Murray, later Lord Mansfield) and Curil's Answer (neither of
which have been previously printed) in an Appendix, transcribing them
from the original documents in the Public Record Office (Rose, 145-53).
These documents reveal that Lord Chancellor Hardwicke was faced with
the first but certainly not the last occasion in which a court was asked to
make a literary-critical distinction between "works of learning" and other
8. Pope v. Curll, 2 Atk 342, 26 ER 608 (1741). An earlier version of Rose's account of the case
may be found in Rose, "The Author in Court." Aversion of this article was also published in Cardozo
Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 10 (1992): 475-93.
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writings. The eighteenth-century Court of Chancery felt in no way
inhibited from recognizing "learned works," even in less familiar forms,
and the court deemed it "certain that no works have done more service to
mankind, than those which have appeared in this shape, upon familiar
subjects, and which perhaps were never intended to be published; and it is
this that makes them so valuable . . ." (Rose, 63-64). Questions of
commercial value had not yet been separated from issues of social merit
and public utility. Just as the courts might deny protection to immoral
works, however profitable, so they might extend protection to works of
recognized merit, however personal and private they might seem.
Pope's suit posed a more fundamental challenge to the court, for it
forced an authoritative resolution of where the author's property lay. The
court made a distinction between the physical letters, possessed by the
recipient or his assigns, and the author's right to copy, which did not
accompany this right of physical possession. Parliament had left it far from
clear what nature of property they were protecting through the Statute of
Anne. Books were statutorily recognized as physical in nature, but in the
developing discourse of literary property, the author's right "was moving
away from its old foundation in the materiality of the author's manuscript"
(Rose, 65). Until the end of the eighteenth century it remained plausible
to argue that the author could have no property in ideas; he relinquished
any property he had with the conveyance of the manuscript and its
publication. It took decades to develop and refine the concept of the
literary work and the idea of intangible property.
The heart of Rose's work lies in his account of the battles between the
London booksellers and their competitors that took place between 1740 and
1774. In arguing for and against the author's natural rights to the fruits of
his labor, the era's leading lawyers, jurists, judges, and men of letters
defined the central principles of copyright and its necessary limitations.
From an examination of primary sources, Rose demonstrates how this
debate articulates themes of liberal possessive individualism, the rhetoric
of natural rights, traditions of gentlemanly conduct, codes of honor and
respect for reputation, empirical psychology, religious imagery, and
Augustan and Romantic ideals of composition, along with more suppressed
themes of republican virtue. This debate, moreover, was evidently an
international one, for it keyed national rivalries between England and
Scotland (still regarded by many English as a colony populated by rude and
savage peoples), and pitted the claims of a growing Scottish intelligentsia
and a profitable provincial book trade against the traditional privileges of
a wealthy and well-connected London elite.9
9. For an excellent discussion of this rivalry and its manifestations in questions of literary property,
see Kathryn Temple, "Johnson and Macpherson: Cultural Authority and the Construction of Literary
Property," Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 5 (1993): 355-88. A fine explication of the growth
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Readers will enjoy the drama in Rose's account of the public excitement
surrounding the arguments and the decision of Donaldson v. Beckett;' °
legal scholars will appreciate the care with which he attends to the
ambiguities of the historical record. He clearly articulates the central
paradox of this momentous case. The House of Lords managed to "settle"
one of the most hotly debated legal questions of the eighteenth century, but
it manifestly failed to provide any rationale for its decision. In voting
against the author's perpetual rights, the House of Lords went against the
advisory opinion of the majority of the twelve common law judges, and
determined that copyright would henceforth be limited to the statutory term.
The historical record renders little insight, however, into which of the
available doctrines supported this decision (if, indeed, it was a single
doctrine):
[A]lthough the struggle concluded with a rejection of the London
booksellers' claim that copyright was perpetual, it by no means
concluded with a rejection of the powerful representation of authorship
on which that claim was based-and this affected the way in which
the Lords' decision came to be understood. . . . [Samuel] Johnson
understood the decision in Donaldson as a compromise between the
author's claim and the broader needs of society, but the peers
themselves had articulated no such theory. As we have seen, they
simply resolved the practical question of the perpetuity .... [In the
longer run it was necessary to make some sense of their vote.
(Rose, 107-8).
Due to a clerical error, contemporaneous reports of the case made it appear
that the House of Lords decision followed the advisory opinion of the
judges, rather than reversing it. Donaldson was interpreted as an
affirmation of the author's common law right, followed by a decision that
the perpetuity was taken away by the statute. Although such a reading of
the decision can no longer be sustained, its influence at the time was
substantial. The author's "natural right" continued to be argued. Claiming
that their properties had been expropriated, the booksellers continued to
press Parliament for an extension of the term. Authors like Southey,
Wordsworth, and Coleridge protested the "loss" of their natural inheritance
well into the nineteenth century. Their arguments were reinforced by
Romantic ideas about the relation between an author and his work, and the
nature of originality and genius. These arguments provided the discursive
of British, as opposed to English, nationalism may be found in Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the
Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). Gerald Newman's The Rise of English
Nationalism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987) also provides an important context for the eighteenth-
century literary property debates.
10. 4 Burr 2408.
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resources with which proponents successfully pressed Parliament for
extensions of the terms of copyright in 1814 and again in 1842.
Authors and Owners takes the challenge of interpretive analysis and
cultural critique seriously, situating copyright developments historically,
politically, economically, and aesthetically within a field of contemporane-
ous and often conflicting discourses-the cultural realm within which
authority and legitimacy were negotiated in eighteenth- and early-nine-
teenth-century English society. The complex relations between property
and propriety that were forged in this period continue to influence
contemporary legal regimes.
In The Author, Art, and the Market, Martha Woodmansee adds
significant new dimensions to our understanding of this historical trajectory
by interpreting the relationship between the growth in reading publics and
the development of the discourse of aesthetics. Although aesthetic
philosophy traces its origins to eighteenth-century German intellectual life,
it drew upon English and French sources. It was to have a profound
impact on the very Romantic writers most fully engaged with issues of
copyright in early-nineteenth-century Britain. Woodmansee describes the
development of the modem idea of art as a distinct domain of activity and
the artist as a distinct kind of person with special capacities as historically
contingent cultural creations rather than universal categories of concern.
To rebut contemporary philosophers of aesthetics who continue to treat art
as if it were a timeless or universal category for inquiry," Woodmansee
considers the underlying social and economic conditions that motivated and
shaped the development of the fine arts as a separate discipline in
philosophy in the late eighteenth century. She then links the contributions
of this discipline to the legitimation of developing copyright regimes in
both the German states and in England (via the influence of Romantic
poets).
The major scholarly contribution of Woodmansee's work lies in her
translation from the German of many previously underappreciated or
overlooked eighteenth-century discussions of aesthetics. Precisely because
they were rhetorical and pedagogic, and thus deemed nonphilosophical,
these texts have been marginalized in aesthetic theory. Woodmansee
demonstrates, however, how such texts illuminate the historical conditions,
cultural politics, economic pressures, and social anxieties that shaped an
11. Woodmansee cites Morris Weitz, ed., Problems in Aesthetics (London: Macmillan, 1959 and
1970) as exemplary of a larger tendency in the philosophy of art that includes Monroe Beardsley,
Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present: A Short History (Birmingham: University of Alabama
Press, 1966); Peter Kivy, "Recent Scholarship and the British Tradition: A Logic of Taste-The First
Fifty Years," in George Dickies and R.J. Sclafani, eds., Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1987); Jerome Stolnitz, "On the Origins of Aesthetic Disinterestedness," Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 20 (1961): 131-43; Arnold Berleant, "The History of Aesthetics," British
Journal of Aesthetics 26 (1986): 101-11, 195-203.
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emergent authoritative discourse on aesthetic judgment. Such texts create
a social framework within which we can recognize a work like Kant's
Critique of Judgement not as a timeless statement expounding universal
principles, but rather as an artifact of a particular social situation.
The British origins of German aesthetics were recognized in the
eighteenth century. Addison's papers in the Spectator are often described
as a point of departure for a discourse that constructed the acts of reading
and appreciation in the cultivation of the self. It is clear that eighteenth-
century British writings influenced those German formulations of art,
authorship, originality, genius, literature, and the propriety of reading that
were to become so ubiquitous in the latter half of the century, 2 in what
became known as the "battle of the book." Addison, Woodmansee argues,
was not so much explaining a preexisting practice of consuming art, as
producing a new practice: connoisseurship. Thus he engaged in a
pedagogical activity, defining and promoting beneficial activities for the
leisure of a middle class (Woodmansee, 6). t' Similarly, the late-eight-
eenth-century discourse of aesthetics aimed to promote a set of attitudes
and inculcate characteristic dispositions towards those products of human
endeavor we now designate as fine arts. In short, this discourse attempted
to forge new forms of subjectivity and new sources of value in a market-
oriented society with a growing middle class.
In Woodmansee's analysis, then, discourses do not simply reflect or
represent realities, but play a constitutive role in shaping the realities we
recognize. In this sense, her work might be defined as poststructuralist or
pragmatist in its orientation-it is attentive to the fashion in which new
12. According to Thomas McFarland:
From about 1700 to the Romantic era, cultivated Germans read and were profoundly influenced
by things English... but the British did not read the Germans in return. It was Hume who woke
Kant from his dogmatic slumber, but the only foreign culture Hume himself was interested in was
French. After the advent of Romanticism, the stream of influence almost completely reversed its
direction of flow. Except for a fascination with Byron (and of course with Scott), it is astonishing
how little the German intelligentsia after 1800 were aware of any of the English Romantic writers.
By this time, however, the cultivated English were virtually scrambling to imbibe German culture.
Shelley embarked on a translation of Goethe's Faust even though he did not know German;
Coleridge translated Schiller's Wallenstein, though he made mistakes and found the labor "soul-
destroying." Carlyle built the greater part of his reputation as a mediator of German culture to
the English, and his angry reaction to Coleridge was at least in part conditioned by his
unwillingness to accept him as a competitor priest in the ministration of German sacraments.
By the 1840s, it was suggested that no learned gentleman could afford not to learn German,
considered a cultural necessity in cultivated circles, whereas in the 1770s and 1780s, German
philosophers and Romantic writers regarded England as their spiritual home.
Thomas McFarland, Originality and Imagination (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1985), 47-49. It would
thus appear that English ideas about literary property (and perhaps even the arguments made in the
battles of the booksellers) made their way into German aesthetic philosophy in the last half of the
eighteenth century, and this German aesthetic philosophy was then incorporated into the arguments
made by, and on behalf of, English Romantic writers to extend the term of copyright in the first half
of the nineteenth century, which Woodmansee mentions.
13. All textual page notations for Woodmansee's work refer to Martha Woodmansee, The Author,
Art, and the Market: Rereading the History ofAesthetics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
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forms of knowledge emerge historically to create the possibility of new
ways of being human. Moreover, such possibilities may enable some
segments of society while they exclude others; the discourses of self-
creation that circulate in any society often sustain relations of social
inequality. So, for example, in the emergent bourgeois public spheres of
the eighteenth century, the subject that engages the newly created concept
of the "public" is culturally constructed as both male and literate.
4
Similarly, Woodmansee shows that the subject-position of "author" was a
decidedly gendered one; women could write, they could publish, but they
were not as a consequence recognized as "authors." If Woodmansee's
position might be taken to be poststructuralist in its recognition of the
constitutive power of discourse, there is little overt "theorizing" in her
book. Her arguments emerge with great clarity from judicious readings of
primary texts conscientiously situated in relevant social and historical
contexts of inquiry.
Woodmansee's central thesis is that men of letters created the concept
of "art" during a period of intense social change. In late-eighteenth-century
Germany, the mass increase in literacy and the growth of reading publics
threatened the social and economic position of these gentlemen scholars.
In what "cultivated" elites regarded as a cultural crisis, more "serious"
writings failed to compete successfully with the "light" entertainment that
middle-class readers were so indiscriminately consuming. The prospects
for having "serious" works published were diminished by widespread
practices of piracy which discouraged publishers from risking investments
in books unlikely to find a quick and ready market. Aesthetic philosophy
was thus forged in a context where the increasing commercialization of
literature failed to reward or sustain poets, philosophers, or historians.
Woodmansee suggests that the discipline of aesthetics was a discourse of
compensation for writers in German-speaking states who found themselves
without the sources of income and prestige that networks of patronage
provided elsewhere. Aesthetic philosophy elevated the status of literature,
refined criteria for the proper mode of judging aesthetic merit, and
counseled a more refined and cerebral mode of reading. In so doing, it
separated art from life. Judgment became autonomous from social and
historical contexts.
.Interpreting (and often providing original translations of) theories of art
developed by Abbe Charles Batteux, Moses Mendelssohn, Karl Phillipp
Moritz, Friedrich Schiller, and Johann Adam Bergk in the latter half of the
eighteenth century, Woodmansee contributes a host of new insights into the
14. For a longer discussion of this point see the essays contained in Bruce Robbins, ed., The
Phantom Public Sphere (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Craig Calhoun, "Civil
Society and the Public Sphere," Public Culture 5 (1993): 267-80, as well as the other essays contained
in that issue.
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historical emergence of "the work" as a philosophical and legal concept.
Neoclassical theorists believed art intervened directly in human life. It
affected and moved human audiences, communicated truths, and imparted
beliefs. The excellence of art lay in its instrumental success in serving
human purposes (Woodmansee, 12). Beginning with the reception of
Batteux's treatise The Fine Arts Reduced to a Common Principle (1746),
and Edward Young's Conjectures on Original Composition (1759), German
writers moved away from an instrumentalist theory of art towards one that
stressed its self-sufficiency. They stressed the need to contemplate art
"disinterestedly." Aesthetic judgment would no longer devolve from the
affective workings of art but from the inner perfection of its form.
In 1785, for example, Karl Philipp Moritz asserted that the ultimate end
of the fine arts derived from "the principle of pleasure" and not the
"principle of imitation" of the truths of nature. What provided pleasure
was the work's perfection:
Moritz asserts that the craftsman alone is constrained by principles of
instrumentality. Objects of mechanical art-knife and clock-"have
their purposes outside of themselves in the person who derives
comfort in their use; they are thus not complete in themselves." ...
The artist by contrast, is under no such constraints, for a work of fine
art, "does not have its purpose outside of itself, and does not exist for
the sake of the perfection of anything else, but rather for the sake of
its own internal perfection." It follows that the effects of a work of
art on its audience are irrelevant to its value. Now a function of
purely internal relationships, the value of art is intrinsic. . . . The
artist's sole end or purpose in Moritz's model of art consists in the
creation of a perfectly "coherent harmonious whole" [iibereinstim-
mendes harmonisches Ganze] (Woodmansee, 18).
This new understanding of aesthetic judgment accorded well with certain
quietist brands of German Pietism which demanded a distanced, disinterest-
ed contemplation of a perfect, pure, and self-sufficient Deity regarded as
"an end in Himself' (Woodmansee, 20). By arguing that "[iun its origins
the theory of art's autonomy is clearly displaced theology" (Woodmansee,
20), Woodmansee moves into intriguing, if not fully mapped territory. We
are given insufficient sociological information to determine if the
persuasiveness of the new discipline of aesthetics resulted from these
theological dispositions. Although Woodmansee makes a strong argument
about the personal, professional, and economic motivations of those who
disseminated aesthetic philosophy, we gain far less sense of why other
Germans found these arguments compelling. Nor do we glean any
understanding of the social composition of those networks through which
this aesthetics became influential in German juridical discourse.
Material impulses motivated the valorization of an autonomous realm of
art that could not be appreciated by a "vulgar" middle-class audience
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lacking the skills necessary to appreciate beauty. Insufficiently appreciated
works were indicative, then, not of an imperfect work, but of imperfect
sensibilities (Woodmansee, 21). Due to the economic repercussions of the
massive growth in the German reading public, the rapidly expanding
number of "vulgar" writers, and new forms of reading material, aesthetic
discourse attacked the readers for their shallow interests and publishers for
their desire for quick profits:
For the chief goal of this philosophy was to sever the value of a work
from its capacity to appeal to a public that wanted above all to be
diverted. .. . By shifting the measure of a work's value from its
pleasurable effects on an audience to such purely intrinsic consider-
ations as "the perfection of the work itself," Moritz arms his own and
all difficult writing against the eventuality of a hostile or indifferent
reception. An answer has thus suggested itself to the question with
which I began this discussion: how to account for the momentous shift
from the instrumentalist theory of art to the modem theory of art as
an autonomous object that is to be contemplated disinterestedly...
As literature became subject to the laws of a market economy, the
instrumentalist theory, especially in the affective formulation given to
it by the generation of Mendelssohn, was found to justify the wrong
works. That is, it was found to justify the products of the purveyors
of strong effects, with whom more demanding writers could not
effectively compete. The theology of art fashioned by Moritz offered
such writers not only a convenient but a very powerful set of concepts
with which to address the predicament in which they found themselves
(Woodmansee, 32).
If the philosophy of aesthetics attempted to rescue art from the
determination of the market by formulating a new concept of the work, a
new disposition towards art also needed to be inculcated. In Schiller's
letters of the 1790s that comprise On the Aesthetic Education of Man, the
philosopher argued that aesthetics had the power to bring men to freedom.
Over the course of the letters he recommends that men's attentions shift
from politics to a contemplation of beauty in art. This tendency in
Romantic thought is well-known, although perhaps more telescoped in
Schiller's personal thinking-in the violent aftermath of the French
Revolution, a personal cult of art replaces a political commitment to human
emancipation (Woodmansee, 58-59). Arguing against any insistence on
accessibility in poetry but rather for a poetry that would uplift people and
challenge them to transcend the everyday and to encounter the ideal,
Schiller urges the cultivation of a new form of reading. This endeavor
would engage all of man's faculties, integrate and reunite him with his self,
and restore the whole person to the fullness of his being: "[Ploetry acquires
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Woodmansee digs to find the root of Schiller's extravagant claims for
art, not in "an impassioned interest in human emancipation by peaceful
means, but [in] the very material existential considerations of a professional
writer in Germany at the end of the eighteenth century" (Woodmansee, 59).
By attributing Schiller's vision of "aesthetic education" wholly to the self-
interest of professional writers, Woodmansee may be less than generous.
Raymond Williams's remarkable book, Culture and Society, 1780-1950,15
suggests that in England, Romantic ideologies were complex and potential-
ly humane responses to the economic devastation and social misery visited
upon English society by the Industrial Revolution. At least a brief
consideration of the German social and economic situation and the impact
of wage labor and its cultural significance would seem necessary before the
discourse of aesthetics could be persuasively dismissed wholly as a matter
of compensatory self-interest foisted upon a society by a marginalized elite.
If the nature of the artistic work and the appropriate manner of its
reception were central features of the modem drama of aesthetics, the
concept of "authorship" played a strong supporting role in this per-
formance. In the eighteenth-century German states, professional writers
found themselves in precarious positions. Without the traditional networks
of patronage that existed in England and France, without the legal
safeguards of copyright or even the conventional standards of propriety that
Rose alludes to, writers who refused to cater to popular tastes found
themselves unable to sustain a livelihood and unable to protect themselves
against piracies. In Germany, the notion of the author as "an individual
who is solely responsible-and thus exclusively deserving of credit-for
the production of a unique, original work" (Woodmansee, 35) had to be
laboriously constructed. This was especially so in a cultural milieu which
viewed writers as mere vehicles for received truths or divine inspiration.
They were masters of traditional strategies, deploying common materials to
achieve prescribed effects in a respected craft. The elevation and
internalization of inspiration in the notion of "original genius" is, of course,
one of the main achievements of German Romanticism, as is the idea that
the work of art was imprinted with the personality of its creator. As
articulated in the theories of Herder, Goethe, Kant, and Fichte, such ideas
elevated the status of serious writers and legitimated and established their
claims to property in their writings.
The notion of the literary work had to be refined before copyright laws
could be passed in the German states. In Britain the literary property
debates took place in legal forums. In Germany the same questions were
probed in philosophical discussion. How could the book be anything more
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than a physical object? How could property subsist in an immaterial
entity? How could ideas be owned? Where could an author's property be
seen to lie? The German debate, which attracted the energies of poets,
philosophers, publishers, and jurists to address the status of "the book,"
took place primarily between 1773 and 1794. It produced no less than
thirty-five publications on the topic. Woodmansee's examination of these
documents demonstrates how imbricated the issue of the propriety of piracy
was with the salient philosophical questions of the era. Was there an
ethical and religious obligation to share ideas? Was the intellect of man an
individuated one? How was the author of the work and the parameters of
that authorship to be evaluated? Answers to these questions drew upon and
consolidated the ascendancy of formalist aesthetics. The German resolution
of the question of copyright (which finds its clearest expression in Fichte's
1793 essay, "Proof of the Illegality of Reprinting") is not in substance
much different from the doctrines formulated by Warburton and Blackstone
in England a few decades earlier. By distinguishing between the physical
object, the ideas it presents, and the form in which those ideas are
presented, the author's right is justified by the individuality of the form that
is his own expression (Woodmansee, 51-52).
Woodmansee does not explore the circulation of ideas between England
and Germany in this period, although she makes a strong case in her final
chapter for the influence of German Romanticism on those English poets
who pressed for copyright reforms in early-nineteenth-century Britain
(notably Southey, Wordsworth, and Coleridge). Attention to how ideas
developed in one context became influential in another is commendable and
especially necessary in historical legal scholarship. One wonders, however,
whether English jurists might not have had a prior influence on German
philosophers, given the intense German interest in English intellectual life
during this period.
David Saunders's Authorship and Copyright is a work that demonstrates
none of the original scholarship or attention to detail that characterize both
the Rose and Woodmansee volumes. Unlike those two efforts to sustain
interpretive theses through original readings of primary materials,
Saunders's book is a survey of the history of copyright in five jurisdictions.
Saunders attempts to provide a comprehensive history of the origins and
development of copyright and author's rights laws, to refute theoretical
perspectives toward the history of copyright that deny law's "positivity,"
and to argue that laws of copyright and regimes of author's rights are
conceptually and categorically autonomous. The book fails to fulfill these
objectives.
Authorship and Copyright cannot serve as a comprehensive survey of the
field of copyright history. It is, unfortunately, wholly reliant upon readily
available secondary sources. Moreover, even as an overview of the
secondary literature, the book is inadequate. Although the book was
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published late in 1992, the author seems unaware of the many social and
historical studies in intellectual property that appeared in the late 1980s and
early 1990s.16 These omissions have the unfortunate effect of making his
treatise seem anachronistic. If the book had been published a decade
earlier, it would have been a welcome contribution to the field. Were
Saunders to have analyzed the primary historical sources, his inattention to
recent secondary sources would have been less serious. Saunders, however,
is content to connect and paraphrase arguments from older secondary
surveys readily available elsewhere. If these labors had resulted in an
engaging and accessible survey of the historical development of copyright
law and author's rights, the book might still have been a welcome resource
for classroom use. Regrettably, it cannot serve even this purpose
adequately, due to the obscurities of Saunders's rhetoric. In his own words,
he is deliberately engaged in "positivities and polemics" (Saunders, 10)"7
that make the book far from accessible. His pugnacious prose and
intemperate tone detract from what might have been an adequate, if
conventional, consideration of the origins and development of copyright
and author's rights laws in Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United
States.
Although Saunders purports to produce "a work of history that
reconnects a phenomenon of print literate cultures-authorship-to its legal
conditions, and a legal phenomena--ownership of copyright-to its
historical and cultural conditions" (Saunders, vii), it is symptomatic of his
text that he fails to historically contextualize the central terms of his subject
matter. Not recognizing, as Woodmansee and Rose so clearly do, how
historically contingent the underlying concepts of copyright are, he begins
his book with the four words: "This is a work. . ." (Saunders, vii). In any
other context, this would be an unobjectionable and common use of
language. However, in a volume concerned with the emergence of
copyright law, such a phrase takes for granted precisely what should be at
issue-the modem idea of the work as a discrete and autonomous entity.
As Rose and Woodmansee so carefully demonstrate, the concept of the
work emerged over decades of concrete struggle, and continues to perplex
artists and lawyers with the complexities of its potential meanings.
The theoretical agenda of Saunders's book is a rather difficult one to
follow. Saunders wishes to refute positions that deny the law's positivity
or see the law as the consequence of other historical forces unfolding. He
creates two theoretical positions from which he distinguishes his own
approach. The first he calls "Romantic Historicism," the second he deems
"Poststructuralism." The first glorifies the birth of the author as an
16. See the books and articles cited in note 1.
17. All textual page notations for Saunders's work refer to David Saunders, Authorship and
Copyright (New York: Routledge, 1992).
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inevitable event in the unfolding history of mankind, while the second
celebrates the death of the individualist author in a jouissance of linguistic
intertextuality. Both positions, he suggests, undervalue the law and its
autonomy. The following extended quotation demonstrates the lack of
clarity and specificity with which Saunders makes this argument:
This study is intended also to illustrate what a practical and pluralist
form of literary and cultural studies might look like-not least as an
alternative to the poststructuralist ascendancy in literary and cultural
theory. Crudely put, this means a return to historical information...
in [a] milieu [in which] the emergence of the literary author has been
taken to exemplify how aesthetic self-production is achieved: hence
the importance accorded to a Romantic theme-the "birth" of the
author. The presumed mundanity of legal matters allowed practical
conditions of authorship such as ownership of copyright to be reduced
to small change, regardless of the fact that in the actual world of book
publishing they were big money. More recently, in what has seemed
a powerful theory-based breakthrough, a poststructuralist (or
deconstructionist) account of authorship has popularized a counter-
theme-the "death" of the author. This second account offers a
critique of the author as the origin and end of meaning, and presents
itself as an emancipation-there are tones of an epochal shift in
cultural politics-from the individualized authorial subject of Romanti-
cism. The preconditions of all possible forms of personhood (and
meanings) is now to be "language," "discourse," or "writing." Yet
once again the status of institutional conditions-including legal
arrangements-is trivialized, this time by an enthusiastic dismissal of
positive fact as a discursive fiction arbitrarily imposed on linguistic
possibility (Saunders, viii).
It is difficult to know to whom Saunders is referring because he so seldom
names his targets when making these sweeping characterizations. Nor does
he demonstrate how other scholarly interpretations of the historical data
actually fit his categories of denigration. In short, he never clearly engages
the work of other theorists or demonstrates that his own interpretation of
the historical record is superior. Instead, he occasionally makes reference
to the work of others by an annoying use of scare-quotes (around phrases
often taken out of context) that indicates his distance from and distaste for
the scholarly work of others. At no point does he engage the arguments
of others directly, using the historical materials to argue for an alternative
reading of the record. This is especially disturbing given his failure to
examine any of the original sources or to engage in primary research; not
having done the spade-work, he is hardly in a position to assume such a
churlish attitude towards the labors of others.
The categories of Romantic Historicism and ahistoric Poststructuralism
that he evokes as counterpoints to his own position are endlessly repeated
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but never fully developed. Saunders names Ian Watt's 1957 The Rise of
the Novel as the exemplar of his first category-a work now more than
thirty years old, and not without its critics. For Saunders, the Romantic
Historicist approach is suspect because it "establishes the author as the
necessary consciousness of history," whereas the Poststructuralist is guilty
of positing the author "as the necessary preliminary for the dissolution of
consciousness into its real-that is, nonconscious-linguistic and textual
determinations" (Saunders, 1).
One can be sympathetic to Saunders's desire for comprehensive studies
of copyright that are grounded in concrete historical contexts and still
criticize his casting of all other scholars of copyright into these two
caricatured categories. He refuses to define poststructuralism (Saunders, 3),
and thereby precludes a determination of whether there actually are any
copyright historians that fit the category as he defines it. Nonetheless,
Saunders attacks his anonymous adversaries by evoking well-known
poststructuralist theorists:
On the question of authorship, it seems to me, authorities such as
Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault have not spoken
with a single voice. Although an impression has formed that they
have all equally embraced the image of "transgressive" language as
"author," this impression is false. For Foucault in particular, as I will
argue... there was no lasting commitment to a notion of language or
writing as the antecedent condition of all social being.
This is not to say that-among the epigones-extravagant formula-
tions of the discursive "death" of the author were not proposed. On
the contrary, we have grown familiar with the figure of the author no
longer as the origin of the work but as the imaginary discursive effect
thrown up by discourse. We are familiar too-and sometimes not a
little weary-with the "critical politics" that has been assumed to flow
from this turn to language. It is as if we were asked to believe that
an adequate historical account of copyright law could be written
entirely in terms of linguistic profusion, textual subversion and
unbounded plasticity of being (Saunders, 3).18
For a reader unfamiliar with the work of Barthes, Derrida, or Foucault,
these passages are incomprehensible; for one who is, they simply lack
specific referents. We are not told who has formed such an impression of
transgressive language, whom he considers "the epigones" to be, or where
or in what contexts familiarity with the author as "imaginary discursive
effect" has been felt. The identities of those who might be urging "an
18. Saunders conflates deconstruction and poststructuralism, as well as discourse, language, and
writing. Throughout the book he assumes that the poststructuralist term "discourse" is simply
equivalent to language, without recognizing the concept's dominant referent-systems of signification
operative as regimes of power/knowledge that are based in and disseminated through institutions and
realized in institutional practice.
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adequate historical account of copyright law ... in terms of linguistic
profusion" remain clouded in mystery. Readers unfamiliar with literary
theory will soon find themselves confused. Those who are comfortable
with such theory will find themselves annoyed by Saunders's failure to
name his antagonists and actually engage their scholarship.
There are no deconstructionist studies of copyright law, and those works
that might loosely be deemed poststructuralist are also resolutely histori-
cal-attentive to a wide range of material and social contexts. In addition
to Rose's and Woodmansee's works above, Mary Poovey's sparkling essay,
"The Man-of-Letters Hero: David Copperfield and the Professional
Writer,"19 comes to mind. Poovey effectively adopts a poststructuralist
approach to consider the construction of a new form of gendered
personhood and new forms of identity and psychology in both law and
literature during the period 1837-1842, a period marked by an intense
struggle to extend the term of copyright. If Saunders ignores the historical
nature of many scholarly works with poststructuralist orientations, he
similarly ignores a wide range of scholarship that historicizes German and
English Romanticism and links it to global and domestic social forces.2°
In other words, poststructuralist studies may be attentive to historical detail,
just as works about Romanticism are not necessarily universalizing and
may make historically specific claims. In short, Saunders simply avoids
any scholarship that transgresses the artificial categories he has created.
Despite his pleas for historical specificity and attention to the contingen-
cy of context, Saunders does not carry out his announced agenda. For
example, his account of the battle over the book (the struggle to gain
copyright protection for authors and prevent piracy) in eighteenth-century
Germany relies upon a single source-a French text published in Stock-
holm.2' He does not appear to have examined any of the massive German
literature published in the eighteenth century, or even the published
collection of the debates, and ignores much of the relevant secondary
literature. Saunders takes large chunks from Woodmansee's early article
19. In Mary Poovey, Uneven Developments: The Ideological Work of Gender in Mid-Victorian
England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 89-125.
20. In addition to Williams, Culture and Society, see Jonathan Arac and Harriet Ritvo, eds.,
Macropolitics of Nineteenth-Century Literature (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991);
Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983); Marjorie Levinson et al. eds., Rethinking Historicism: Critical Readings in
Romantic History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Jerome J. McGann, The Romantic Ideology
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985); Thomas Pfau, "The Pragmatics of Genre: Moral Theory
and Lyric Authorship in Hegel and Wordsworth," Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 10
(1992): 397-422; Marion B. Ross, The Contours of Masculine Desire: Romanticism and the Rise of
Women's Poetry (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Andrew Rutherford, ed., Byron: Augustan
and Romantic, (London: Macmillan, 1990); and Clifford Siskin, The Historicity of Romantic Discourse
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
21. S. Stromholm, Le droit moral de l'auteur en droit allemand, francais et scandinave, avec un
aperfu de l'dvolution internationale, in Etude de droit comparde, vol. 1, L'evolution historique et le
mauvement international (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt and Soners Forlag, 1966).
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"The Genius and the Copyright" 22 to build his own case, but later
dismisses it as yet another example of the Romantic Historicist dialectic
rise of "man's" subjectivity (Saunders, 219-20). Not having translated or
interpreted the vast range of eighteenth-century German literature on the
topic,2 3 or even making the effort to discuss the full range of
Woodmansee's own published work, Saunders cannot counter her
arguments by positing an alternative proposition using the historical
evidence. Nonetheless, he feels justified or compelled to cast her within
the categories he has fabricated.
To transcend the theoretical categories he finds so inadequate, Saunders
declares a need "to do justice to the historical positivity of certain legal-
cultural arrangements relating to authorship" (Saunders, 4). The parameters
of this endeavor lack clarity, unless we take this as an imperative to mere
description. It is not at all certain what Saunders takes "historical
positivity" to be. He does not distinguish between specifying historical
concepts (statuses, dispositions, institutions, and relationships) and adopting
the stance of social-scientific positivism. It is quite possible to engage in
historical specification but nonetheless regard such phenomena as socially
contingent, humanly constructed, culturally shaped, and implicated in
relations of power and knowledge. It is not necessary to see phenomena
as objectively necessary or historically inevitable to regard humanly
constructed historical forms positively, that is, as lived realities. In the
matter of copyright law, we can explore terms like authorship and the work
in a fashion that is sensitive to the full dimensions of the historical
conditions of their emergence and social movement. This is the nature of
the project in which both Rose and Woodmansee have attempted to engage,
and one to which Saunders, given his professed desire for historical
contextualization, should be sympathetic.
The historical context that frames Saunders's own purview of positive
law is limited. He considers the relevant "coordinates for such a history"
to be (i) the growth of print literacy; (ii) "a historical anthropology of
personhood" (that recognizes the historical specificities of the modes of
being a person); and (iii) a recognition of the determining role of law "as
an independent and variable phenomenon of culture" (Saunders, 6).
Unfortunately, Saunders fails to develop at least two of these three themes.
In several of his chapters he successfully draws upon the cultural
historiography of the spread of print. The promise of "a historical
anthropology of personhood" is, regrettably, an empty one. We get little
22. Eighteenth-Century Studies 17.
23. Saunders reveals a lack of facility in German by his incorrect use of an umlaut in the German
term for book (Saunders, 109, 111, 114)-not a crime, but certainly a telling error for an author who
implies a familiarity with the "explosion of doctrine" and begins his argument, "[als the German
literature of ideas shows..." (Saunders, 108).
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sense of the cultural contexts that created the role of the author, the socially
constructed personas, or the culturally mediated consciousness of writers,
publishers, lawyers, or judges.
Similarly, his insistence upon the independence of law is simply that;
Saunders cites none of the theoretical literature on the relation between law
and society, the debates about law's relative autonomy, or its constitutive
nature. His assertions that "the law" has historically particular objects both
reifies law and simplifies its social consequence. To recognize the law as
determinative does not require that we see it in splendid isolation from
other social forces, including other systems of thought which may well
influence its social meaning and interpretation. The law, for example,
shapes subjectivities or offers subject-positions that individuals may
occupy; but it never operates in isolation from other discourses which
afford other possibilities and opportunities to challenge legal hegemo-
nies."
If the theoretical positions adopted by Authorship and Copyright are
difficult to discern, the substantive thesis at least is clear. Saunders's
central claim is that "in copyright regimes the general object has been to
provide a remedy against unauthorized reproduction of a protected
commodity; in droit moral regimes, to protect the integrity of an authorial
personality" (Saunders, 8). Saunders chooses his evidence very selectively
to buttress this thesis; to make his argument he must ignore vast amounts
of legal evidence and important parts of the historical record. A few
examples will suffice. As Rose's reading of the eighteenth-century British
cases has revealed, issues of propriety and reputation-matters of "authorial
personality"-were litigated through the use of the copyright statute on a
regular basis. Similarly, the late-eighteenth-century literary property
debates were waged in public pamphlets and petitions that valorized
particular forms of authorship and evoked new ideas of genius and
originality. The historical record shows that public arguments on behalf of
copyright connected property, propriety, originality, personality, and
posterity in ways that undermine Saunders's rigid dichotomy between
copyright and droit moral regimes.
In the nineteenth century, Romantic ideals of authorial persona were
crucial to the arguments for a longer copyright term. Saunders convenient-
ly ignores the efforts of Romantic poets like Southey and Wordsworth in
the literary property debates and the specific social significance accorded
to the labors of the author in this period. He must do so to maintain his
characterization of British copyright law as entirely concerned with the
regulation of a simple commodity. The passions and polemics that
circulated publicly in both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries around
24. I discuss this point in greater detail in "Room for Manoeuver," and "Contesting the Self."
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issues of copyright suggest that representations of personhood were forged
in legal struggles and that the law provided institutional forums for the
legitimation of new personas.
Saunders's insistence on separating property and personality in legal
regimes cannot be maintained.25 In his claims for the pristine purity of
English common law from all concerns with "personality," Saunders
attempts to make the concerns of Anglo-American copyright laws and
Continental regimes of author's rights categorically distinct. Unfortunately,
the reasoning of moral rights may be found in the texts and subtexts of
Anglo-American and Canadian copyright discourse as easily as compromis-
es between author's personality rights and economic interests may be found
in Continental legal discourse.26 The extended historical research in
which Rose and Woodmansee have engaged make Saunders's assertions
about autonomous laws with singular objects less than tenable and raise
other serious questions about the form that future historical scholarship of
intellectual property should assume.
If we are to seriously engage in the effort to historically contextualize
intellectual property laws, one of the central organizing strategies of
Saunders's book serves as an obstacle rather than a vehicle for promoting
creative thought. The presentation of each jurisdiction as having its own
autonomous law belies the complex interrelations of legal regimes in the
historical periods under examination. Woodmansee comes closest of these
three authors to addressing the transnational flow of ideas in this period,
but even her account is less than complete. Rose makes no attempt
whatsoever to look outside of England, or even to the eighteenth-century
cultural struggles to make Great Britain a predominantly English (rather
than Welsh, Irish, Scots, or Celtic) nation-state. Modern nation-states
developed legal systems in relation to one another, often in relations
marked by an anxiety of influence. English law, for example, was a
"national" institution to the extent that it was distinguished from French
law in the eighteenth century and ideologically constructed as the source
of the Englishman's greater freedoms and the English Empire's moral
superiority." But every identity contains traces of the differences that
constitute it, and the law is no exception.
Both Rose and Woodmansee have written truly impressive studies of the
interplay between legal, philosophical, political, and aesthetic discourses in
national contexts. But given our increasing knowledge of the ways in
25. Because Saunders's book was written at the time the Australian government was considering
the inclusion of moral rights in its copyright regime, it is difficult not to infer a political subtext in its
content.
26. I thank Peter Jaszi for this observation.
27. See John W. Cairns, "Blackstone, an English Institutist: Legal Literature and the Rise of the
Nation State," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 4 (1984): 318-60; Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation
1707-1837; Newman, The Rise of English Nationalism.
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which global involvements shaped European knowledges and institutions
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 8 we might hope that future
studies will be less insular and less contained by the genealogies of current
nation-states. Rather than identify the founding fathers and search for the
origins of the central premises of modernity in each and every nation, we
might well consider the international contexts and concerns in which these
ideas were developed and exchanged. There is a strong need for interdisci-
plinary historical scholarship that attends to domestic legal developments
in a fashion attentive to global forces and struggles. We might hope for
histories of copyright, trademark and patent, for example, that consider the
complicated interrelationships among colonial expansion, trade relations,
and geopolitical influence.
Our histories of intellectual property are histories of some of European
modernity's greatest artifacts. But as we become aware of how profoundly
ideological and historical these purportedly universal phenomena are, we
need alternative histories that trace the cultural significance of legal forms
in a fashion more fully sensitive to their social functions within multiple
realms of meaning and power.
28. For discussions see Eric Wolf, Europe and the People without History (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1982); Jean and John Comaroff, Ethnography and the
Historical Imagination (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); Jean and John Comaroff, Modernity and Its
Malcontents (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Nicholas B. Dirks, ed., Colonialism and
Culture (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992); Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern
Law (New York: Routledge, 1992); Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Conscious-
ness (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); Javed Majeed, Ungoverned Imaginings: James Mill's
The History of British India and Orientalism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992); Sidney W. Mintz, Sweetness
and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York: Viking Penguin, 1985); Eric Stokes,
The English Utilitarians and India (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963); Gauri Viswanathan, Masks of
Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989);
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